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ACREAGE, RESIDENCY AND EXCESS-LAND SALE:
STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN MODERN
AGRICULTURE AND HISTORIC
WATER POLICY
Three issues in current reclamation debate are the 160-acre
water limitation, residency, and equitable sale and distribu-
tion of project land not meeting acreage and residency condi-
tions. This Comment proposes that a water allotment of 1000
acres per farmer would allow efficient and rewarding farm-
ing without violating settlement, anti-speculation, subsidy,
and family-farm policies. Arguably, residency is neither re-
quired by statute nor necessary to further these policies. If
required at all, residency should be liberally defined to allow
farmers flexibility in choosing homesites. The Comment
concludes by examining current proposals for strict land-
price control and for governmental purchase and resale to
qualified would-be farmers.
INTRODUCTION
Everywhere the family farm, defined as the entrepreneurial family
farm rather than the agrarian mythic family farm, has competed
successfully. In fact, . . . the success of American agriculture is the
success of the entrepreneurial family farm .... I
In National Land for People, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation,2 the
federal district court in Washington, D.C. directed the Bureau of
Reclamation (Bureau)3 to enforce the excess-land provisions of fed-
eral reclamation law4 by initiating public rule-making proceedings.'
1. H. HOGAN, ACREAGE LIMITATION IN THE FEDERAL RECLAMATION PROGRAM
65 (1972) (emphasis original).
2. 417 F. Supp. 449 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated as moot, No. 76-2027 (D.C. Cir.,
Jan. 20, 1978).
3. The Bureau of Reclamation is part of the Department of the Interior. The
Secretary of the Interior supervises the -operations of the Bureau. He is au-
thorized to perform such acts and to make such rules and regulations as are
required to implement the purposes and the provisions of reclamation law. 43
U.S.C. § 373 (1970). The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to delegate his
powers and duties under reclamation law to the Commissioner of Reclamation.
16 U.S.C. §§ 590z-11 (1970).
4. Reclamation law is defined by statute as "the Act of June 17, 1902...,
and all Acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto." 43 U.S.C. § 371(b)
(1970).
5. 417 F. Supp. at 453.
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On August 25, 1977, the Bureau responded by publishing its pro-
posed Reclamation Rules and Regulations for Acreage Limitation
(1977 Proposed Rules).6 The Bureau proposes to enforce the 160-acre
limitation to the receipt of federal water. Any purchaser of excess
land would be required to reside within fifty miles of the land.8 The
Bureau also proposes new procedures for the sale of excess land.9
The Bureau plans, finances, constructs, and operates about 150
water-resource projects in the arid and semiarid lands of seventeen
western states. 10 The bulk of the water from the projects is sold to
local irrigation districts created under state law to contract with the
Bureau for water purchase and distribution to farmers."
Massive redistribution of land will occur if the 160-acre water
limitation 2 and the residency requirement are enforced. Approxi-
mately 1.2 million acres of land will be sold if federal water is
withheld pursuant to the excess-land provisions of reclamation
law." Eighty percent of the excess land lies in California, mostly in
the Westlands Water District and in the Imperial Irrigation Dis-
6. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426). Promulgation
of the 1977 Proposed Rules will be delayed because a federal district court has
enjoined Secretary of the Interior Andrus from continuing rule-making pro-
ceedings until the government prepares, circulates, and considers an adequate
environmental-impact statement. County of Fresno v. Andrus, No. F-77-202
(E.D. Cal., Dec. 7, 1977) (order granting preliminary injunction). The creation of
many smaller farms could result in excessive use of pesticides. Affidavit of
William W. Wood, Jr. in Support of Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction at 5, id. Affidavit of Claude Finnell in Sup-
port of Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 4, id. The reclaimed land could revert to desert. Excess owners may
choose to retain their land even without water in order to take advantage of
possible geothermal development in the Imperial Valley. Affidavit of Donald
Cox in Support of Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Prelimi-
nary Injunction at 2, id. The government's failure to appeal the injunction
provides time for Congress to consider changing reclamation law before the
1977 Proposed Rules are promulgated.
7. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,046 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.4(b)).
8. Id. at 43,046 (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.4 (j)-(l)).
9. Id. at 43,048 (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. §§ 426.9(b), .10, .12).
10. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, TuE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERI-
OR'S PROPOSED RULES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE RECLAMATION ACT OF 1902: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS at iv (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 USDA STUDY].
11. CoMp. GEN. OF THE U.S., CONGRESS SHOULD REEVALUATE THE 160-ACRE
LIMITATION ON LAND ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE WATER FROM FEDERAL WATER RE-
SOURCES PROJECTS 5 (1972).
12. Reclamation law does not limit ownership of land. However, it does limit
the use of water from federally constructed irrigation projects. In an arid
climate, the effect of limiting water to a certain number of acres is to limit the
number of acres that can be profitably owned. Therefore, in most cases recla-
mation law results in an ownership limit. See Taylor, The Excess Land Law:
Execution of a Public Policy, 64 YALE L.J. 477, 486 & n.38 (1955).
13. 1978 USDA STUDY, supra note 10, at v.
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trict. 4 A residency requirement would render ineligible for federal
water approximately one-third of the land in the Westlands 15 and
one-fourth of the land in the Imperial Valley.16
Redistribution of land would have significant economic effects.
California is the leading agricultural state in the United States,
producing over 250 crop and livestock commodities and more than
twenty-five percent of the nation's fresh fruit and vegetables. 17 The
creation of smaller farms would reduce farm income.' 8 The supply of
some crops would decline, and the price of many crops would in-
crease. 19 Local communities could experience economic depres-
sions.
20
It has been suggested that the entire federal program of subsidized
irrigated farming should be dismantled because the policies effec-
tuated by reclamation law are outdated. 21 Under this view, acreage
limits and required residency are unnecessary and counter-prod-
uctive to efficient market operation.2 2 The farmer, it is argued,
should bear the full cost of his water, allowing food production and
land development to be subject to normal market forces.
23
However, the scope of this Comment is limited. Acreage and resi-
dency limitations on federal water, if modified to reflect modern
farming needs, may further some important national policies. The
first major issue this Comment addresses is whether the present 160-
acre irrigation entitlement should be raised to conform with modem
14. See id., at iv.
15. See CouIp. GEN. OF THE U.S. APPRAISAL PROCEDURES AND SOLUTIONS TO
PROBLEMS INVOLVING THE 160-AcRE LIMITATION PROVISION OF RECLAMATION LAW
22 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 GAO REPORT].
16. See Hearings Before the Water and Power Resources Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs (Palm Springs, Cal., Jan. 6, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 Palm Springs Hearings] (unpublished statement of
Louise Willey on file with the San Diego Law Review).
17. R. FELLIXETH, POLITICS OF LAND 26 (1973). The success of California ag-
riculture is critical to the economy of the nation because California is the
primary source of alfalfa, almonds, apricots, artichokes, asparagus, avocados,
lima beans, broccoli, Brussels sprouts, carrots, cauliflower, celery, cherries, cut
flowers, dates, eggs, figs, garlic, grapes, lemons, lettuce, cantaloupes, nectarines,
olives, onions, navel oranges, peaches, pears, chili peppers, persimmons, plums,
pomegranates, spring potatoes, prunes, safflower, spinach, strawberries, sugar
beets, tomatoes, turkeys, and walnuts. Id.
18. 1978 USDA STUDY, supra note 10, at vii.
19. Id., at 23-26.
20. 1978 Palm Springs Hearings, note 16 supra (unpublished statement of
Lewis Bacon on file with the San Diego Law Review).
21. H. HOGAN, supra note 1, at 292.
22. Id.
23. Id.; R. FELLMETH, POLITICS OF LAND 60 (1973).
agriculture. The legal validity of the current limit is not disputed.
However, the proper acreage figure should be determined by balanc-
ing the farmer's need for larger farms against the policies the water
limitation was designed to serve.
The second major issue is the residency requirement. In 1972, a
federal district court in Yellen v. Hicke 24 held that reclamation law
requires landowner residency. However, in United States v. Imperial
Irrigation District, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit revers-
ed and vacated Yellen on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing to sue.25 The standing issue is examined. The statutory and legis-
lative history of the residency question is then surveyed to determine
whether residency is a current legal requirement. Residency is also
viewed in light of the national policies it is purported to execute.
After discussing the acreage limitation and residency questions,
this Comment concludes by examining current proposals for sale of
excess project land owned by persons not meeting the acreage limita-
tion and by non-residents. The Bureau's traditional methods of de-
termining the value of excess land violate the anti-speculation provi-
sions of reclamation law. Current proposals to regulate appraisal are
examined. This Comment also examines legislation recommending
government purchase of excess land, sale to would-be buyers lacking
money and financing, and federally guaranteed loans to buyers.
THE BASIC ACREAGE ENTITLEMENT
Current law limits the use of federal reclamation-project water to
160 acres per owner. The Reclamation Act of 1902 (1902 Act) pro-
vides that "[n]o right to the use of water for land in private own-
ership shall be sold for a tract exceeding 160 acres to any one land-
owner . -." The Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926 (1926 Act)
provides that no federal water may be supplied to any one owner for
land in excess of 160 acres unless the owner executes a recordable
contract to sell the land at a price and under terms and conditions
satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary).27 The
contracts typically give the Secretary a power of attorney to sell the
land if the owner does not sell within ten years.28
24. 352 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Cal. 1972), vacated sub noma. United States v.
Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977).
25. 559 F.2d 509, 542 (9th Cir. 1977).
26. 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1970). One hundred and sixty acres is equivalent to a
square one-half mile on each side. See WEBSTER's THIRD NMW INTERNATIONAL
DIcTIoNARY 2052 (Cove ed. 1967).
27. 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1970).
28. Renda, Owner Eligibility Restrictions-Acreage and Residency, 8 NAT.
RESOURCES LAW. 265, 274 (1975).
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The 160-acre figure derives from the federal Homestead Act of
1862.29 In the nineteenth century, this figure was generally assumed
to be adequate.3 0 The 160-acre water limit has captured national
interest through publicity concerning United States v. Imperial Irri-
gation District.31 The acreage issue in Imperial Irrigation District is
limited to an alleged special exemption from all acreage limits.
3 2
However, the appellate court's application of the 160-acre limit to
the Imperial Valley33 serves to illustrate the broader problem. The
160-acre limit is outdated. Congress should now raise the water
entitlement in all projects to conform with modern agriculture.
The 160-acre issue may be framed as whether water should be
supplied to any one owner beyond 160 acres. The flaws in this
approach are that there have been no legal restraints on water to
leased land3 4 and forms of multiple ownership have been al-
lowed which permit the farming of huge acreages,3" thereby violating
reclamation policy.36 Discussion of the adequacy of the number
"160" is irrelevant because leasing and multiple ownerships circum-
vent any ownership limitation. This Comment advocates a new ap-
proach to the acreage-limitation issue. This approach bases the water
limit on the farming unit, not on the ownership unity Four steps in
analysis are required. First, the proper farming acreage consistent
29. Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 161 (1970)).
30. 1 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMIISSION, PUBLIC LAND LAW AND POLICIES
RELATING TO INTENSIVE AGRICULTURE 212 (1969). But cf. Taylor, The Excess
Land Law: Execution of a Public Policy, 64 YALE L.J. 477,483 n.22 (1955) (at the
Third National Irrigation Congress, Senator Boyd said that a tract of 300-400
acres was reasonable when machinery was used).
31. 559 F.2d 509, 520 (9th Cir. 1977). The appeal in Yellen was consolidated
with the appeal in Imperial Irrigation District. In Imperial Irrigation District,
another district court had held that acreage limitations did not apply to the
Imperial Valley. Persons who were substantially identical to the Yellen plain-
tiffs were allowed to intervene in the Imperial Irrigation District appeal. Id.
The appellate court reversed both judgments, id. at 542, holding that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing to bring the residency action but that acreage limitations
applied in the Imperial Valley.
32. Id. at 524, 535-36.
33. Id. at 542.
34. Acreage Limitation Provisions of Reclamation Law: Their Administra-
tion and Suggested Changes: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Water and Power Resources of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Oversight Hearings]
(statement of Gilbert Stamm).
35. See Office of the Solicitor, Bureau of Reclamation, Basic Solicitor's Opin-
ions (Jan. 1976), reprinted in 1976 Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 58.
36. For a discussion of basic reclamation policies, see text accompanying
notes 61-87 infra.
37. See 124 CONG. REC. S2532 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978).
with valid policy should be determined. Second, a multiplier for
family size should be provided. Third, the basic entitlement should
be increased for inferior local growing conditions. Fourth, leasing
should be limited.
The Proper Farm Size Consistent with Valid Policy
The first step in acreage-limitation analysis is determining the
proper farm size consistent with reclamation policies. At a minimum,
a farm should be large enough to provide an adequate living. Two
basic problems hinder determination of the adequate farm size. The
first is the inherent difficulty, if not impossibility, of defining "ade-
quate living." The second is sharp disagreement over the economic
viability of the small farm.
The Bureau has stated that the farm size should be "adequate to
support a family and pay water charges,"3 8 but the Bureau has not
defined "adequate." "Adequate" might be defined as "above the
poverty line. ' 39 Subsistence-level farming may have been justifiable
in 1902 when a farmer produced much of his clothing, food, and
tools. 4° However, the modern farmer relies on a cash economy, buy-
ing a large proportion of living necessities with crop income. 41 The
creation of rural slums through forced subsistence-level farming
should not be federal policy. The United States Department of Ag-
riculture has implied that the basic farm income should be at least
equal to the regional median family income.42 Under this definition,
160-acre farmers in the Imperial Valley 43 and in the North Platte
Project do not make an adequate living.
44
The second problem is determining the minimum viable farm size.
Many studies indicate that an Imperial Valley farm of 320 acres or
less cannot make a profit.4 5 However, a recent government study
38. E.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,049 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.13
(c)).
39. 2 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND LAWS AND
POLICIES RELATING TO INTENSIVE AGRUCULTURE 161 (1969).
40. 1976 Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 186-87 (statement of Ralph
Brody).
41. Id.
42. 1978 USDA Study, supra note 10, at 20.
43. Id., at 55.
44. Id., at 38.
45. A 1978 report by the Agricultural Commissioner of Imperial County indi-
cated that a new farmer, even with a good credit rating, would lose $86,905 in the
first year on a 320-acre plot in Imperial Valley at 1977 costs and prices. 1978
Palm Springs Hearings, note 16 supra (unpublished statement of Claude Finnell
on file with the San Diego Law Review). At 1977 costs and prices, a 320-acre
farm with 40 acres in sugar beets, 80 acres in alfalfa, 80 acres in milo, 40 acres in
cotton, and 80 acres in barley would yield $101,935 but would cost $188,840 in
mortgage debt service and borrowed production costs. This calculation does not
include the farmer's down payment on his land and his family living expenses.
Thus, few farmers beginning with 160-acre plots could survive. Id. One typical
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concluded that profits could be made on 160-acre plots in all recla-
mation projects.46 Differences can be attributed, in part, to the
fact that the studies derive price and cost figures from different
years.47 At the very least, the profit discrepancies show that small-
farm net income is highly sensitive to price and cost variations be-
cause losses in one area or in a particular crop cannot be counter-
balanced by other gains. No study based on only one year's profit can
adequately reflect the high risk involved in farming.48 As the recent
government study conceded, larger farm units may be necessary to
maintain a viable farming operation over time.49 A 1977 University of
California Cooperative Extension study verified this conclusion by
showing a net loss of over $15,000 during a recent ten-year period on
an average 320-acre farm in the Imperial Valley.50
Small-farm success is also hampered by the fact that farm owners
naturally designate 160 acres of their best land as "non-excess"
5' 1
when their excess land is sold pursuant to the recordable contract
Imperial Valley farmer, in 1977, lost money on tomatoes, onion seed and cotton,
recouped his costs on wheat, sugar beets and market onions, and made a profit
only on dehydrated onions. Id. (unpublished statement of Arthur Caston on file
with the San Diego Law Review). A 1977 University of California farm exten-
sion study reported that the owner of a typical 320-acre Imperial Valley farm
lost money in at least five of the 10 years between 1967 and 1976. Von Maren, An
Economic Analysis of Typical Farming Operations in the Imperial Valley 1-2
(Dec. 15, 1977) (Imperial County Cooperative Agricultural Extension report on
file with the San Diego Law Review).
46. 1978 USDA STUDY, supra note 10, at v. Returns to management and to
operator at 1977 land prices and costs on 160-acre plots were $6,000 in the
Imperial Valley, $7,000 in the North Platte Project, $15,000 in the Westlands, and
$19,000 in the Columbia Basin Project. On 320-acre plots, the returns ranged
from $14,000 in the North Platte Project to $53,000 in the Columbia Basin
Project. On 640-acre plots, the returns ranged from $23,000 in the North Platte
Project to $125,000 in the Columbia Basin Project. Id. These returns increased
when based on the most recently approved pre-project land price. Id.
47. The price figures used in the 1978 USDA Study were projections for 1977
based upon pre-1977 prices. Id., at 51. The price figures in the study by the
Imperial County Agricultural Commissioner were actual 1977 prices. 1978 Palm
Springs Hearings, note 16 supra (unpublished statement of Claude Finnell on
file with the San Diego Law Review).
48. 1978 USDA STUDY, supra note 10, at vi.
49. Id.
50. Von Maren, An Economic Analysis of Typical Farming Operations in the
Imperial Valley 1 (Dec. 15, 1977) (Imperial County Cooperative Agricultural
Extension report on file with the San Diego Law Review).
51. 1978 Palm Springs Hearings, note 16 supra (unpublished statement of
William W. Wood, Jr. on file with the San Diego Law Review).
provision of the 1926 Act. Therefore, some new farm units created by
excess-land sales will be disproportionately composed of less fertile
land. Standing alone, inferior land which can be farmed profitably as
an adjunct to better land through cost-spreading may be inadequate
for small-farm success.5 2 This unfortunate result is due to the unreal-
istically low water entitlement.
In addition to the determination of the adequate farm size, the role
of technological efficiency must be considered. It is well documented
that economies of scale 53 requires a farm of more than 160 acres to
produce maximum output per unit of cost. Recent studies indicate
that maximum efficiency is achieved on farms ranging from 440 to
2000 acres, depending on the location of the land and the crops
grown.5 4 Percentage return on net assets, one measure of efficiency,
steadily increases as annual gross sales increase.55 Certain types of
farming require expensive machinery 56 which must be applied to
larger acreages to reduce unit costs. 57 The increase in the average size
of irrigated farms in the seventeen reclamation-project states shows
the effect of economies of scale. The percentage increase between
1935 and 1964 ranged from 71% in Nebraska to 742% in Arizona.58
The average size of irrigated farms is over 500 acres in fourteen of
the seventeen reclamation states.5 9 Larger farms exist because they
are more efficient.
The real issue is not whether efficiency affects small-farm viability
but whether it is relevant in light of the reclamation policies." The
52. Id.
53. "Economies of scale" is a term of art describing the relationship between
the number of units produced and the cost per unit.
54. Maximum cost-output advantages occurred at 1500-2000 acres in the Im-
perial Valley, 600-700 acres in Yolo County, 640-1000 acres in Kern County, 640-
1280 acres in the San Joaquin Valley Eastside, 440 acres in the irrigated cotton
farms of the Texas high plains, and 1600 acres in the wheat and dry pea farms in
Washington and Idaho. 2 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, FEDERAL PUB-
LIC LAND LAWS AND POLICIES RELATING TO INTENSIVE AGRICULTURE 111-64 (1969).
55. In 1976, the United States Department of Agriculture reported that farms
with annual sales of less than $10,000 had an average return on net assets of
minus .1% to minus 6%, farms with annual sales of $10,000 to $19,999 returned
2.9%, farms with annual sales of $20,000 to $39,999 returned 4.4%, and farms with
annual sales of $100,000 or more returned 6.9%. 1976 Oversight Hearings, supra
note 34, at 214.
56. Id., at 56-57 (statement of Gilbert Stamm).
57. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND
183 (1970); 1978 Palm Springs Hearings, note 16 supra (unpublished statement of
Loucille Purdy on file with the San Diego Law Review). But cf. 1978 USDA
STUDY, supra note 10, at 20 (purchase of equipment is not always necessary due
to the availability of hiring certain custom planting and harvesting operations).
58. 2 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND LAWS AND
POLICIES RELATING TO INTENSIVE AGRICULTURE 116 (1969).
59. Id.
60. See Taylor, TheExcessLandLaw, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 480,515 (1958).
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Bureau has stated that reclamation law executes four national
policies: (1) the maximization of the number of settlers on the land,
(2) the prevention of speculative gain on sales of project lands, (3) the
wide distribution of the governmental subsidies involved in interest-
free construction loans and low-cost water, and (4) the promotion of
the family farm.
61
The first policy is to provide for maximum settlement.62 Propo-
nents of the 160-acre limit argue that efficiency is irrelevant because
a policy of reclamation law is to promote maximum settlement.
6 3
This policy may no longer be necessary because the westward expan-
sion of the nineteenth century, during which the policy originated,
64
has long since ceased.65 Even if settlement policy simply furthers a
current entrepreneurial ideal by increasing the number of farm own-
ers, raising the water entitlement to some reasonably efficient size
still would further settlement policy by dissolving many of the
largest farms.
66
The second policy is anti-speculation.6 7 In an arid climate, the right
to receive a reliable supply of federal water is a valuable asset which
increases the value of the land.68 An essential policy of federal recla-
mation law is the prevention of windfall profits occuring when
speculators buy land at pre-water prices and sell it at post-water
prices.6 9 However, the number of acres per farmer for which water is
supplied need not be limited to prevent huge profits upon resale.
61. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,045 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.1).
62. Id. (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.1(a)).
63. See Taylor, The Excess Land Law, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 480,515 (1958).
64. See PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S
LAND 177-84 (1970); S. Doc. No. 446, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1902); BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT ON LANDOWNERSHIP SURVEY
ON FEDERAL RECLAMATION PROJECTS 67 (1946) [hereinafter cited as 1946 LAND-
OWNERSHIP SURVEY].
65. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND
177-84 (1970); 1 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, PUBLIC LAND LAW AND
POLICIES RELATING TO INTENSIVE AGRICULTURE 318-19 (1969).
66. 1978 USDA STUDY, supra note 10, at 27.
67. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,045 (1977) (to be codified in43 C.F.R. § 426.1(d)). But
cf. H. HOGAN, supra note 1, at 204-09 (arguing that the entire reclamation
program is an unjust enrichment program of federal subsidy to the small
farmer). Section 46 of the 1926 Act does not control the sale price of non-excess
land. 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1970). Therefore, the non-excess owner can capitalize the
subsidy into the selling price. About 79% (8.7 million acres) of all project land is
non-excess. 1978 USDA STUDY, supra note 10, at iv.
68. Sax, Selling Reclamation Water Rights: A Case Study in Federal Sub-
sidy Policy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 13, 13 (1965).
69. Id. at 13-14.
Anti-speculation policy is furthered by the requirement that excess
project land, when sold, must be sold at a price not reflecting the
benefit of federal water.7 0 Where the sale price is limited to pre-
project value, the landowner cannot make windfall profits regardless
of the number of acres sold.
The third policy is the wide distribution of irrigation subsidies.
Reclamation projects offer irrigators three types of subsidies. One
type of subsidy is direct transfer from hydroelectric power revenue
and from municipal and industrial water revenue.7 1 The reason for
the direct transfer is that irrigators were unable to repay their share
of the irrigation-project construction costs in the early years of fed-
eral reclamation.72 Power revenue is the principal source of funding
for project operation, paying not only its own costs but part of the
cost originally allocated to irrigation.
73
Another type of subsidy is direct transfer of funds from the United
States Treasury.7 4 Treasury appropriations provide one-third to one-
half of the annual reclamation expenditures. 75 A third type of sub-
sidy is interest-free money. When the government constructs a recla-
mation project, it charges no interest on that part of the cost the
irrigation district is obligated to repay.76 The interest-free loan is a
subsidy to water-users.7 7 This aspect of subsidy policy can be furth-
ered without acreage limits by applying the Engle formula, which
requires that the landowner repay his ratable share of the interest.
78
70. See text accompanying notes 247-84.
71. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 123.2(I) (R. Clark ed. 1967).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 111.1.
75. Id.
76. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(d) (1970).
77. Sax, Selling Reclamation Water Rights: A Case Study in Federal Sub-
sidy Policy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 13, 13 n.4 (1965).
78. Interest payments coupled with the lifting of acreage limitations are
known as the "Engle formula," named after the sponsor of the Small Reclama-
tion Projects Act, 43 U.S.C. § 422a-k (1970). This statute allows water delivery to
excess land in certain small projects if the landowners forgo the statutory
governmental subsidy represented by interest-free financing of construction
costs and pay interest on their allotted share of the project costs. The benefit of
the interest subsidy is thereby limited to 160 acres per owner. The Engle formula
has been adopted in three specific projects. See 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044,43,045 (1977)
(to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.3(d)(1), (3), (4)). According to one commentator's
calculations, the interest subsidy amounts to 91% of the total cost when spread
over the statutory 50-year repayment period. R. BERIMAN & W. Viscusi, DAM-
MING THE WEST 136 (1973). The California Chamber of Commerce has recom-
mended broad use of the Engle formula. Public Hearings on the Proposed Rules
and Regulations Governing Acreage Limitation for Federal Reclamation Pro-
jects, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation 57 (Imperial, Cal., Nov.
21, 1977) (official reporter's transcript) (statement of Warren Brock on file with
the San Diego Law Review).
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The hydroelectric revenue and the United States Treasury trans-
fers provide a substantial subsidy even without the interest-free
loan.7" As an illustration of the cumulative benefit from all three
types of subsidies, farmers in the Westlands Water District reported-
ly pay $3.50 to $7.50 per acre-foot for water that costs the govern-
ment approximately sixteen dollars per acre-foot to provide.80 How-
ever, the fact that the federal government subsidizes irrigated farm-
ing does not require a low-acreage limit. The federal government
subsidizes many enterprises because it believes benefits thereby ac-
crue to the public. Examples of government-subsidized activities
serving both public and private interests include postal services,
highways, waterways, and crop allotments.
81
The real issue is not whether subsidies should be given but rather
how much any one recipient should benefit. Private gain must be
balanced against public good. The public benefit from federally ir-
rigated farming is plentiful, low-cost food available throughout the
year because of modern technological efficiency. 82 The proper solu-
tion to the subsidy problem is to provide water to farm operators up
to the most efficient acreage size and to withhold water to acreage
beyond this range because further gain accrues to the farmer and not
to the public.
The fourth reclamation policy is to promote the family farm.
83
However, promotion of the family farm concerns the mode of opera-
tion, not the size of the farm. Many large and highly efficient farms
are operated by families. The average size of a family-operated farm
in the Imperial Valley is 449 acres.84 According to a 1978 study,
seventy-seven percent of the farms in the Imperial Valley are single-
family operations.8
79. R. BERKMAN & W. VIscusi, DAMMING THE WEST 134, 137, 145 (1973).
80. L.A. Times, Apr. 28, 1978, § 1, at 3, col. 3.
81. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON THE
ACREAGE LIMITATION PROBLEM 6-9 (1968).
82. Contra, R. BERKMAN & W. VIscusi, DAMMING THE WEST 14-24 (1973) (food
surpluses and low prices caused by agricultural overproduction create an artifi-
cial need to subsidize irrigated farming with tax and power revenues).
83. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,045 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.1(c)).
84. 1978 Palm Springs Hearings, note 16 supra (unpublished statement of
Louise Willey on file with the San Diego Law Review).
85. Id. Single-family operators farm 49% of the total irrigated acres. Multi-
family farmers constitute an additional 17% of the operators and farm an addi-
tional 44% of the acreage. Only 6% of the operators are non-family partnerships,
Extreme positions characterize the debate over the proper farm
size. Representatives of the agricultural industry argue that the large
farmer's ability to produce large quantities of high-quality, low-
priced food for national and world markets should not be restricted
by any arbitrary acreage limitation.86 Proponents of the 160-acre size
contend that 160 acres are adequate and that efficiency is irrelevant
because overriding social policies control reclamation law. The solu-
tion lies somewhere in the middle. One hundred and sixty acres
probably is not a practical size over a period of time. The determina-
tion of the proper farm size involves the interplay of technology and
social policy. Larger farms do not violate family-farm and anti-
speculation policies. Maximization of settlers on the land may not be
necessary today and therefore should not limit acreage. Subsidy
policy does require some limitation on farm size. Even if maximiza-
tion of settlement is a currently valid policy, a basic water entitle-
ment of 1000 acres87 provides an adequate living, allows reasonable
efficiency, limits subsidies to a fair level, and prevents great stretches
of uninhabited land.
Multiplier for Family Size
The second step in determining the proper acreage entitlement is
allowing for the income needs of larger families. Although techni-
cally unnecessary because current law limits owners and not
families,88 a separate spousal multiplier has long been recognized in
Bureau practice. 9 The separate spousal multiplier continues to exist
in the proposed rule permitting a husband and wife to own jointly
320 acres.90 The Bureau's traditional approach allowed ownership of
large acreages by partnerships, trusts, and corporations without re-
quiring family ties among the participating members. 1 The use of
non-family partnerships, corporations, and trusts to circumvent the
160-acre limitation is well documented.92 However, the only justifi-
trusts, and public corporations, farming only 7% of the total acreage. Together,
single- and multi-family farmers operate 94% of the farms and 93% of the
acreage. Id.
86. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON THE
ACREAGE LIMITATION PROBLEM 9 (1968).
87. Secretary of the Interior Andrus recently proposed to Congress that the
maximum family water entitlement should be raised to 960 acres. L.A. Times,
Apr. 14, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
88. See H. HOGAN, supra note 1, at 81-82.
89. 1946 LANDOWNERSHIP SURVEY, supra note 64, at 56.
90. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,046 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.4(b)),
91. Office of the Solicitor, Bureau of Reclamation, Basic Solicitor's Opinions
(Jan. 1976), reprinted in 1976 Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 58.
92. See R. BERKMAN & W. VIScUSI, DAMMING THE WEST 141 (1973); 1976 GAO
REPORT, supra note 15, at 3.
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cation for these forms of ownership under reclamation policy is to
reflect family dependence on the land.
The Bureau's 1977 Proposed Rules provide that partnerships,
corporations, and trusts may own project land only.where there is a
spousal or a direct lineal-descent relationship among all the partici-
pants.9 3 The organization may not hold more than 160 acres for each
qualified participant.94 Although the 1977 Proposed Rules properly
limit the acreage multiplier to family-farm situations, the definition
of family as lineal descendants and spouse is arbitrarily restrictive.
Siblings, uncle and nephew, and other combinations of more distant
relatives may in fact live and farm together as a family. However,
these combinations are excluded from the family-multiplier provi-
sions of the 1977 Proposed Rules.95
Both the spousal and direct lineal-descendant multiplier concepts
are rejected by the 1977 Senate Bill 1812 (The Nelson-Haskell Bill).9 6
Instead, the family multiplier would be limited to the purchase by the
family farmer of an additional 160 acres for at most one dependent
with whom he or she has permanently resided for at least one year
prior to the purchase.
9 7
Spousal and family multipliers effectively provide for the income
needs of larger families and should be retained. Partnerships, corpo-
rations, and trusts should receive water for excess land only if all
participants are members of the same extended family, and the or-
ganization does not hold more than 160 acres for each member.
Acreage Equivalencies
The third step in analysis is increasing the basic water entitlement
for inferior local growing conditions. The principle that the max-
imum acreage should be raised when required by poor growing
conditions is well accepted. 98 Factors to be considered are latitude,
93. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,046, 43,047 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. §§
426.4(h), .7(b)).
94. Id. at 43,047 (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.7 (b)-(e)).
95. Public Hearings on the Proposed Rules and Regulations Governing Ac-
reage Limitation for Federal Reclamation Projects, U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
Bureau of Reclamation 22 (Imperial, Cal., Nov. 21, 1977) (official reporter's
transcript) (statement of John Stull on file with the San Diego Law Review).
96. S. 1812, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S11,300 (daily ed. June 30,
1977).
97. Id. at S11,301.
98. Secretary of Agriculture Bergland has recommended that water eligibili-
ty be made on an area-to-area basis rather than by a strict acreage maximum,
climate, soil, topography, drainage, water quality, land-development
costs, and farm production costs.9 9 Congress has exempted seven
projects from the acreage limitations,100 sometimes using the
rationale that growing conditions require such exemptions. 101
Express adjustments through acreage equivalencies are another
way of accounting for variations in growing conditions. In 1949,
President Truman stated that larger acreages might be necessary to
support a family on some project lands and that Congress should
authorize appropriate adjustments in maximum acreages where nec-
essary under carefully constructed standards. 0 2 Congress has made
upward adjustments in eighteen specific projects under the "acre-
age equivalency" concept.0 3 Acreage equivalency allows varying
amounts of less productive land over 160 acres to be declared "non-
excess" by definition.
10 4
In 1964, the Department of the Interior recommended that
Congress vest the power to declare certain land "non-excess" under
acreage equivalency in the Secretary rather than require an act of
Congress. 0 The disadvantage of this procedure is that the Secretary
may be subject to constant pressure by special-interest lobbies to
grant or to repeal equivalencies.' 06 However, the advantages of ad-
ministrative power to set equivalencies are greater flexibility and
expertise.
101
Legislation allowing the Secretary to set acreage equivalencies on
a project-by-project basis is currently before Congress. 08 Equivalen-
cies would be limited to projects with growing seasons of 180 days or
noting that the average gross crop value in California is $781 per acre compared
with $128 per acre in South Dakota. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture News Release No.
263-78 (Jan. 26, 1978) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
99. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,049 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.13(a)).
100. Id. at 43,045 (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.3(b)).
101. Congress exempted the Kendrick Project in Wyoming, for example,
from the 160-acre limit because the marginal quality of the project lands in a
short growing season made it difficult if not impossible for a 160-acre farm to
furnish a reasonably adequate standard of living. S. REP. No. 838,85th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1957).
102. 95 CONG. REc. 15,045-46 (1949).
103. See 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044,43,045 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.3(c)).
104. Id.
105. See DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., ACREAGE LIMITATION
POLICY STUDY PREPARED FOR THE SENATE COMI. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AF-
FAIRS at ix (Comm. Print 1964).
106. 1 PuBLc LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, PUBLIC LAND LAW AND POLICIES
RELATING TO INTENSIVE AGRICULTURE 331 (1969).
107. See PUBLIC LAND LAw REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S
LAND 183 (1970).
108. E.g., S. 2606, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. S2532 (daily ed. Feb. 28,
1978); S. 1812, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S11,300, S11,301 (daily ed.
June 30, 1977).
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less. 09 One hundred eighteen projects are within 180-day frost-free
areas."' Under one plan, no equivalency could exceed 240 acres.1
Leasing
The fourth step in acreage limitation analysis is determining
whether leasing should be allowed. Current law does not regulate
water to leased acreage where the owner is a non-excess holder.
112
The law regulates ownership, not leasing. Thus, a farmer may now
receive water for only 160 acres of his own land but may operate an
unlimited number of leasehold acres. The only restriction on leasing
is that sale and leaseback arrangements are strictly scrutinized by
the Bureau.113 Leaseback may be disallowed if the seller transfers
less than full title, the leaseback is part of the consideration for the
sale, or the lease period is greater than ten years.
114
The 1977 Proposed Rules impose limits on leasing. A person or
legal entity could lease no more than 160 acres of land served by
federal reclamation water."15 Because the rules would also allow
federal water for 160 owned acres," 6 an individual could farm a total
of 320 acres. A husband and wife could lease 320 acres'1 7 and farm a
total of 640 acres. Although a family partnership, corporation, or
trust may own 160 acres for each qualified family member," 8 the
legal entity could lease only 160 acres." 9 Thus, a five-member family
corporation could own 800 acres and lease only an additional 160
acres. The 1977 Proposed Rules limit leasebacks.120 However, the
only restriction is that the lessee must not have sold the land to the
lessor. Therefore, a farmer can avoid the leaseback restriction by
selling the land and leasing it back from his buyer's buyer.
12 1
109. S. 2606, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S2532, S2534 (daily ed. Feb.
28, 1978); S. 1812, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG REC. S11,300, S11,301 (daily ed.
June 30, 1977).
110. 1976 Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 10 (statement of Gilbert
Stamm).
111. S. 1812, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S11,300, S11,301 (daily ed.
June 30, 1977).




115. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,047 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.8).
116. Id. at 43,046 (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.4(b)).
117. Id. at 43,047 (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.8).
118. Id. (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.7(b)-(e)).
119. Id. (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.8).
120. Id. at 43,048 (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.10(e)).
121. [1977] 7 ENVm. L. REP. (ELI) 10,189, 10,190.
The Nelson-Haskell Bill would limit water to 160 acres of land
leased from the government 122 but would not expressly limit private
leasing.123 Nevertheless, private leasing would be restricted to two
years of any ten-year period, with exceptions for extreme hardship to
the family-farmer lessor. 24 The two-year limit applies to the land,
12
not to the tenant farmer, preventing arrangements by which
leaseholds could be rotated every two years to circumvent the leasing
limit.
Leasing must be examined in light of reclamation policies. The
large-scale leasing the Bureau has permitted in the Imperial Valley
has not violated family-farm policy. Families farm ninety-three per-
cent of the total acreage, 26 and tenant families farm fifty-eight
percent of the land.' 27 Economies of scale encourage a family to lease
as many acres as possible.' 21 Leasing violates no anti-speculation
policy because speculation gains accrue to a seller of land, not a
tenant. Speculation gains are properly prevented by monitoring the
sale price, 29 not by limiting the size or the mode of operation.
However, large-scale leasing violates maximum-settlement poli-
cy' 30 by allowing a small number of resident farmers to control huge
tracts. Furthermore, unlimited leasing arguably violates reclamation
policy in favor of spreading the government subsidies among the
greatest number of farmers' 31 (as does unlimited ownership). Al-
though the subsidies initially accrue to the operator in the form of
cost-reducing low-priced water,132 the practice of sharing cost and
profit passes the subsidies to the owner. Where the Engle formula
33
is used, the interest subsidy is repaid. However, the power, water,
and Treasury-revenue subsidies still accrue unfairly to the operator
and to the owner when unlimited leasing is allowed.
13
122. S. 1812, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S11,300, S1l,302 (daily ed.
June 30, 1977).
123. Id. at S11,301.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See 1978 Palm Springs Hearings, note 16 supra (unpublished statement
of Louise Willey on file with the San Diego Law Review).
127. Id.
128. See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 247-84 infra.
130. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
131. See 1976 Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 32 (statement of Gilbert
Stamm).
132. Will the Family Farm Survive in America?: Joint Hearings Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Small Business and the Senate Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 82 (1976) (statement of Robert
Palmer).
133. See note 78 supra.
134. See text accompanying notes 71-79 supra.
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Large-scale leasing has been necessary under an artificially low
ownership limitation which has prevented an adequate living and
thwarted the use of economies of scale. If the basic water entitlement,
adjusted for family size and for growing conditions, were increased
to a reasonably adequate and efficient size, large-scale leasing would
be unnecessary. Proponents of unrestricted leasing argue that leasing
is often a more practical plan for beginning farmers because higher
income can be generated by renting land and investing limited capit-
al in machinery and production expenses. 13 In partial recognition of
the validity of this argument, both the 1977 Proposed Rules 136 and
the Nelson-Haskell Bill 1 37 allow leasing a maximum of 160 acres. A
better plan provides water for 1000 acres per farm operation. The
adjusted basic entitlement should be determined, and a family
should not be allowed federal water for any owned or leased acreage
in excess of that adjusted acreage figure. Senate Bill 2606, in-
troduced by Senator Church in 1978, would allow water for 1280-
acre farms created by any combination of ownership and leasing.1 38
A new farmer could then either buy or lease his full entitlement
depending on his capital capabilities.
In the first section of this Comment, the authors have proposed
that the basic water entitlement should be raised. A farm of 1000
acres is adequate and efficient and does not violate federal reclama-
tion policy. The second section of this Comment addresses the issue
of whether the owner must reside on the land to receive federal
irrigation water.
THE QUESTION OF RESIDENCE
Adding to the confusion caused by the haphazard interpretation'39
and the lax enforcement 1 40 of reclamation law over the years, the
135. 1978 Palm Springs Hearings, note 16 supra (unpublished statement of
Claude Finnell on file with the San Diego Law Review); H. Carter & G. Dean,
Cost-Size Relationships for Cash Crop Farms in Imperial Valley, California
39 (May 1962) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
136. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,047 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.8).
137. S.1812, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S11,300, S11,302 (daily ed.
June 30, 1977).
138. S. 2606, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S2533 (daily ed. Feb. 28,
1978).
139. [1977) 7 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELI) 10,189.
140. Renda, Owner Eligibility Restrictions-Acreage and Residency, 8 NAT.
RESOURCES LAw. 265, 280 (1975) (Bureau hasn't enforced residency since 1926
because it believed that the 1926 Act abolished the residency requirement). Cf. 2
courts have failed to clarify the residency issue. In Yellen v. Hick-
el,141 a federal district court in California ruled that residency was a
continuing prerequisite to the receipt of federal water. However, in
United States v. Imperial Irrigation District, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs in Yellen lacked standing to
sue and vacated the judgment.142 Thus, resolution of the residency
issue has yet to occur.
Exactly one week after the decision in Imperial Irrigation District,
the Bureau published its 1977 Proposed Rules.' The Bureau pro-
poses that a purchaser of excess land must reside within fifty miles of
the land. 44 However, there has been no judicial resolution of the
residency issue. The Bureau has issued the regulations without
knowing whether residency is a legal requirement. The Bureau re-
cognized this precise dilemma when it stated that "[r]esidency is,
however, believed to be a legally required condition of receiving
federally-subsidized water. .... ,,145
Standing: A Roadblock to a Judicial Decision on Residency
In Yellen, suit was brought by several individuals residing within
the Imperial Irrigation District but owning no farmland.'46 The
plaintiffs sought to compel the Secretary to enforce the residency
requirement of section 5 of the 1902 Act, which states that "no such
sale [of water rights] shall be made to any landowner unless he be an
actual bona fide resident on such land, or occupant thereof residing
in the neighborhood .... ,,147
The government, and the intervening defendants whose lands
would be affected by reinstating residency, challenged the plaintiffs'
standing to sue. 48 The district court found that the plaintiffs were
within the class of people protected by section 5 of the 1902 Act.
149
"If the plaintiffs are not granted standing to bring this suit, the
WATERS AND WATER RiGrrs § 110.3, at 124 (R. Clark ed. 1967) ("This difficulty is
compounded by the fact that there is no official, authoritative list of the laws
amendatory of and supplementary to the Reclamation Act-of 1902, and there-
fore nobody knows precisely what comprises that body of law which is de-
scribed in the statutes as 'the reclamation law'. ").
141. 352 F. Supp. 1300, 1319 (S.D. Cal. 1972), vacated sub nom. United States v.
Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977).
142. 559 F.2d 509, 542 (9th Cir. 1977).
143. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426).
144. Id. at 43,046 (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.4(j)-(l)). The 1977 Proposed
Rules require residency of future buyers but not of present owners. Id. The
Bureau intends to propose additional rules in the near future requiring residen-
cy of all owners. Id. at 43,044.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. 352 F. Supp. at 1312.
147. 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
148. 352 F. Supp. at 1303.
149. Id.
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Department of Interior will in effect be given a license to disregard
the law, as well as an immunity from challenges by the intended
beneficiaries of the legislation in question.'
'5 0
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,' denying
standing on the basis of a test it had enunciated earlier in Bowker v.
Morton.5 2 In Bowker, a group of small farmers requested an injunc-
tion forcing the sale of excess land in a state irrigation project
receiving water from a joint state-federal reservoir. 5 3 The plaintiffs
sought application of the 160-acreage and residency limitations. 54
The court did not reach the merits because it held that the plain-
tiffs did not have standing. 55 The Bowker test for standing is that
the plaintiff plead (1) a particularized injury, (2) concretely and de-
monstrably resulting from the defendant's action, which (3) will be
redressed by the relief sought. 156 The plaintiff in Bowker stated that
the government's failure to enforce reclamation law prevented family
farmers from purchasing project land at reasonable prices. 57 How-
ever, the plaintiffs failed to allege a particularized injury resulting
from governmental action because they neither alleged a desire to
buy land in the state service area nor alleged what price they could
afford. The plaintiffs did not show that the injury would be redressed
by the relief sought because discontinuance of water to ineligible
owners would not force a sale at reasonable prices.1
5 8
In Yellen, the plaintiffs alleged that they resided within the bound-
aries of the water district, that they desired to own land in the
district, and that the only source of water was the federal project.'59
The essence of the plaintiffs' case was that enforcement of the resi-
dency requirement would result in making farmland available at
prices the plaintiffs could afford. 60 The plaintiffs attempted to dis-
tinguish their status from the plaintiffs in Bowker by alleging that
150. Id. at 1303-04.
151. 559 F.2d at 542.
152. 541 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1976).
153. Id. at 1348.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1349. See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (the "gist of the
question of standing" is whether the party has "alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues ... ." Id. at 99).
157. 541 F.2d at 1350.
158. Id.
159. 559 F.2d at 518.
160. Id.
they desired to buy farmland.161 However, nothing in the record in-
dicated what price the aggrieved parties could afford or that en-
forcement of the residency requirement would decrease land prices
to a level the plaintiffs could afford.'62 The appellate court noted that
the price of land is determined by the relationship between the
supply of and demand for land, based on the assumption that the
market would naturally adjust to a new residency requirement at
indeterminable levels.163 Even if the price were reduced, the plain-
tiffs might not have sufficient income to purchase land.164 Therefore,
the plaintiffs did not satisfy the first two parts of the Bowker stand-
ing test: the injury was neither particularized nor did it flow
concretely and demonstrably from the government's failure to re-
quire residency. 165 The plaintiffs did not satisfy the third part of the
Bowker test because discontinuance of water to non-residents would
not necessarily redress the plaintiffs' alleged injuries. 166 Requiring
residency would not force landowners to sell their land. Some land-
owners might elect to use the land for such non-agricultural purposes
as industry or residences and would no longer need federal irrigation
water.167 The court summarized its holding on the standing issue by
quoting its earlier opinion in Bowker:
It is a mere speculative possibility that any relief which is appropriate
under the statute will bring about the result sought by plaintiffs ...
[T]he solution to plaintiffs' problem depends upon decisions and ac-
tions by third parties who are not before the court and who could not







165. Id. at 519.
166. Id. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190,206 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (the stand-
ing doctrine maintains that the plaintiff must have such a strong connection to
the controversy that the holding will demonstrably cause him to win or lose in
some measure). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
167. 559 F.2d at 519.
168. Id. It is important to note that the appellate court granted standing to the
Yellen intervenors in the acreage case. United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.,
559 F.2d at 523 (consolidated on appeal with Yellen because of inconsistent
district court holdings). The Yellen intervenors in the acreage case were sub-
stantially identical to the plaintiffs in Yellen, the residency case. Id. at 520. The
Yellen group had standing in the acreage case but not in the residency case
because different interests were alleged. In the residency case, the plaintiffs
asserted an interest in reducing land prices to an affordable level. Standing was
denied because the plaintiffs neither alleged what price they could afford nor
proved that enforcement of residency would reduce prices to an affordable
level. Id. at 518. In contrast, the Yellen intervenors in the acreage case asserted
an interest limited to some reduction in land prices. Id. at 522. Land sold under
acreage-limitation law is necessarily below current market value because by
statute the price must be the appraised value minus the value attributable to the
availability of federal water. 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1970). The court found that statu-
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The plaintiffs in Yellen might not contest the Ninth Circuit's hold-
ing on standing because the Bureau's provision for residency in the
1977 Proposed Rules may enforce residency at less expense to the
plaintiffs. However, if Yellen is taken to the United States Supreme
Court, standing again should be a key issue.
A final judicial resolution of the residency question on the merits
may be necessary if the United States Supreme Court finds that the
Yellen plaintiffs have standing. Furthermore, the validity of the
residency provision in the Bureau's 1977 Proposed Rules depends on
tory price control gave the Yellen intervenors the necessary stake in the out-
come of the lawsuit to confer standing. 559 F.2d at 523.
The significance of the contrary standing holdings at the appellate level is not
that typical would-be purchasers have no standing to raise the residency issue.
The lesson is that the residency plaintiffs alleged too broad an interest. Reduc-
tion of land prices to an affordable level is an interest which can not be satisfied
by court-ordered enforcement of residency. Had the Yellen group in the acreage
case alleged an interest in reducing prices to an affordable level, the court
should have denied standing on authority of Bowker because sale at a con-
trolled price under 43 U.S.C. § 423e would not necessarily reduce land prices to
an affordable level. Likewise, the plaintiffs might have had standing in the
residency case had they alleged the more limited interest in some reduction of
land prices because a residency requirement would cause some indeterminable
reduction in prices. Would-be purchasers raising residency or acreage issues in
the Ninth Circuit should limit their alleged interest to some reduction in land
prices.
Although the Yellen group alleged different interests in the residency and in
the acreage cases, relief in the acreage case may be as speculative as relief in the
residency case. The court denied standing to the plaintiffs in the residency case
on the ground that the most it could order was a discontinuance of water
deliveries to nonresidents. Id. at 519. Nonresidents would not be forced to sell. It
is mere speculation that enforcement of the residency requirement would en-
able the plaintiffs to afford the land. Id.
The court distinguished the acreage from the residency case by finding that
enforcement of the acreage limitation definitely would reduce land prices. Id. at
522. However, the excess landowners may wish to cultivate different uses, as
may the nonresident landowners. E.g., Affidavit of Donald Cox in Support of
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 2,
County of Fresno v. Andrus, No. F. 77-202 (E.D. Cal., Dec. 7, 1977). The most the
court could order in the acreage case is a discontinuance of water deliveries to
excess owners. Neither the nonresident landowners nor the excess landowners
could be forced to sell the land. Relief is speculative in both cases.
The court admitted that the relief in the acreage case is somewhat speculative.
559 F.2d at 523. However, the court minimized the speculative element by stating
that the Yellen group need not show with certainty that they will be able to
purchase the excess lands if the 160-acre limit is enforced. Id. All that must be
shown is that the Yellen intervenors could never buy at below current prices
unless the acreage limit were enforced. Id. The court found that the plaintiffs in
the residency case could have obtained relief by other means. Prices could
become affordable through changes in federal tax or in loan regulations, or
through changes in the crop-support system. Id. at 518-19. However, this ar-
gument can be applied equally to acreage. The alleged interest in some reduc-
tion of land prices could be satisfied by tax, by loan, or by crop-support changes.
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whether residence is required by statute. Therefore, the statutory and
legislative history of the residence requirement must be examined.
Did the 1926 Omnibus Adjustment Act Abolish the Residency Re-
quirement of the 1902 Reclamation Act?
Section 5 of the 1902 Act restricted the sale of water rights to
residents on the land or in the neighborhood. 169 Section 46 of the
1926 Act makes joint-liability contracts mandatory in all projects
begun after May 25, 1926.170 Section 46 contains detailed provisions
for a 160-acre limitation, but omits mention of a residency require-
ment.17 ' However, there are no provisions in the 1926 Act specifically
repealing the 1902 Act. Thus, an examination of the legislation pre-
ceeding the 1926 Act is necessary to understand congressional intent
in failing to require residency.
The Warren Act of February 21, 1911 (Warren Act) was the first
departure from the individual contracting system.172 The Warren Act
gives the Secretary power to enter into contracts with existing irriga-
tion districts for the construction and operation of irrigation and
drainage facilities. 17 Section 2 of the Warren Act provides that
"water shall not be furnished. . . to any one landowner in excess of
an amount sufficient to irrigate one hundred and sixty acres.'1 74 The
Warren Act does not impose a residency limitation on water de-
liveries. 175 The residency requirement of the 1902 Act is limited to
individual water-right sales. Because individual water-right sales
were not made in Warren Act projects, no basis existed for imposing
the residency requirement. In 1915, the Idaho Supreme Court stated
that "the act of Congress of February 21, 1911, known as the Warren
Act, and the subsequent act of Congress passed August 13, 1914,
known as the Reclamation Extension Act, make no provision for
residence upon the lands to be irrigated from the waters of a govern-
mental project."'
1 76
169. 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1970). For a discussion of the duration of the residency
required by the 1902 Act, see text accompanying notes 192-208 infra.
170. Joint-liability contracts require the Secretary to contract with the irriga-
tion district, rather than with individuals, before water is delivered from any
new project. See 43 U.S.C. § 428e (1970). A major advantage of joint-liability
contracts is that all lands within an irrigation district are obligated to pay the
cost of providing water, thereby eliminating problems when large numbers of
landowners do not desire to participate in the project. H.R. REP. No. 1065, 66th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4 (1919) (statement of Secretary of Interior Lane).
171. 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1970).
172. 43 U.S.C. §§ 523-525 (1970).
173. See New York Trust Co. v. Farmers' Irrig'n Dist., 280 F. 785,795 (8th Cir.
1922).
174. 43 U.S.C. § 524 (1970).
175. 43 U.S.C. §§ 523-525 (1970).
176. Nampa & Meridian Irrig'n Dist. v. Petrie, 28 Idaho 227,240, 153 P. 425,429
(1915).
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Congress authorized joint-liability contracts on the Rio Grande
Project in 1917.' 7 The resulting appropriations statutes did not re-
quire residence.17 8 The Act of May 15, 1922 (1922 Act) extended the
joint-liability contract procedure by empowering the Secretary to
contract with any irrigation district and to release the government
lien in individual contracts after contracts are made with the appro-
priate irrigation district.19 Because the 1922 Act does not mention
residency, it may imply that Congress was establishing a practice of
imposing no residency requirements on projects developed under
joint-liability irrigation contracts. However, the 1922 Act neither
limits acreage nor is otherwise repugnant to the 1902 Act. Therefore,
repeal of residency may not be a proper inference.
180
Shortly after the passage of the 1922 Act, Congress formed the
Committee of Special Advisors on Reclamation (Fact Finders
Committee) to criticize reclamation law and to make recommenda-
tions for its revision. 8 ' Nowhere in the 1924 report of the Fact
Finders Committee182 appeared proposals for a residency require-
ment. The Fact Finders Committee did not conclude that the 1902
Act mandated more than a threshold residency requirement. The
Fact Finders Committee made no recommendations to Congress to
apply residency requirements to joint-liability contracts. Arguably,
the Fact Finders Committee would have included a perpetual-resi-
dency requirement had it believed one required by the 1902 Act.
Even assuming that the Fact Finders Committee believed that the
1902 Act required perpetual residency, it did not believe it necessary
to retain a residency requirement. Joint-liability contracts omitting
residency had been used for thirteen years when, in 1924, the Fact
Finders Committee stated that "no better conditions with respect to
tenancy could be expected under the conditions of American life."'183
The Fact Finders Committee accepted the tenancy conditions result-
ing from removal of a residency requirement under joint-liability
contracts. Although a goal of the 1902 Act was to discourage tenancy
177. Ch. 27, 40 Stat. 148 (1917).
178. E.g., ch. 113, 40 Stat. 674 (1918).
179. Ch. 190, 42 Stat. 542 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 512 (1970)).
180. See Recent Developments, Reclamation Law in Litigation: Acreage and
Residency Limitations on Private Lands, 21 S.D. L. REV. 695, 724-28 (1976).
181. See 1946 LANDOWNERSHI SURVEY, supra note 64, at 45.
182. See S. Doc. No. 92, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-40 (1924).
183. Id. at 96.
and to encourage owner operation,"4 it appears that the Fact Finders
Committee believed that water rights under the emerging joint-lia-
bility contract system did not and should not require residency.
In the 1926 Act, Congress made joint-liability contracts mandatory
on all subsequently constructed projects and did not require residen-
cy. 8 Shortly after Congress passed the 1926 Act, it appropriated
funds for projects on the Sun River,'8 6 the Vale,187 the Salt Lake
Basin'8 8 projects, and the Kittikas division of the Yakima project. 189
None of these acts included a residency requirement.
Congress long has been aware that the Bureau has not required
residence as a condition for water in joint-liability projects, yet
Congress never has reinstituted a general residence requirement. In
1944, opponents of the excess-land law had argued before the Senate
Commerce Committee that reclamation law would impose a residen-
cy requirement in the Central Valley of California. Assistant
Commissioner of Reclamation Warne clearly stated that the residen-
cy requirement had not been applied to any project since 1922.190 The
1977 Proposed Rules mark the first time since the advent of joint-
liability contracts that the Bureau has proposed to require residen-
cy. 191 Congressional acquiescence in the longstanding Bureau as-
sumption that residency is not required in joint-liability contracts
may imply congressional belief that the 1926 Act abolished the resi-
dency provisions of the 1902 Act.
184. E.g., 35 CONG. REC. 1386 (1902) (statement of Rep. Henry C. Hansbrough
of North Dakota).
185. See 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1970).
186. Ch. 27, 44 Stat. 958 (1927).
187. Id. at 959.
188. Id. at 960.
189. Id.
190. Hearings on H.R. 3961 Before a Subcomm, of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 761-62 (1944) (statement of William Warne,
Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation). Mr. Warne stated:
The Act of May 15, 1922 (42 Stat. 541), authorized water right applica-
tions signed by the individual landowners to be dispensed with when the
United States enters into a contract with an irrigation district to pay
construction charges. Since the act of 1922, almost all of the projects
have been developed under it.
As a result of the act of 1922, where individual water right applications
with private landowners are dispensed with, the residence requirement,
which is an incident of water right applications, is also not applicable,
and it has not been required in connection with any project since the act
of 1922 where the United States relies solely upon a contract with an
irrigation district for the return of the construction cost of a project.
191. See Renda, Owner Eligibility Restrictions-Acreage and Residency, 8
NAT. RESouRCEs LAw. 265, 280 (1975).
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Is the Residence Requirement of the 1902 Act Lifted After the Initial
Water Application Is Approved?
If the 1926 Act abolished the residence requirement of the 1902
Act, the residency provision in the Bureau's 1977 Proposed Rules is
invalid. However, assuming arguendo that reclamation law requires
residence, the issue of the length of residency required by the 1902
Act remains. Section 5 of the 1902 Act provides for two separate
forms of contract.1 92 Subsection 1 of section 5 deals only with home-
steaders of public land; subsection 2 deals exclusively with pur-
chase of water rights for private land under the federal reclamation
program. Subsection 1 contains no explicit residency requirement. 193
However, a homesteader under the 1902 Act was under a five-year
residency requirement because subsection 1 of the 1902 Act expressly
required compliance with other homestead provisions 9 4 and because
an 1866 homestead statute required residence for five years.195 Once
the five-year requirement was satisfied, the homesteader was free to
leave without fear of losing his water patent. The distinction between
public-land homesteaders and private landowners is important.
Homesteaders were under a five-year residency requirement. The
residency requirement for private lands, however, is merely actual
residence at the time of sale of the water right.'96 Thus, the duration
of residency depends on the date at which the "sale" occurs. Unfortu-
nately, the 1902 Act does not define sale.
If sale occurs upon completion of all payments, the 1902 Act re-
quires residency only until all payments are completed. 97 This in-
terpretation is plausible in light of the provision in section 5 that a
permanent right to the use of water attaches when all payments are
made. 198 Thus, a bona fide resident buyer could make all his pay-
ments at once and leave the area without losing his water right.
192. 43 U.S.C. §§ 431,439 (1970).
193. 43 U.S.C. § 439 (1970).
194. Id.
195. See ch. 127, 14 Stat. 67 (1866). In 1912, Congress passed the Three-Year
Homestead Act, ch. 153, 37 Stat. 123 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 164 (1970)). The
Three-Year Homestead Act reduces the five-year homestead residency require-
ment to seven months in each of three years.
196. 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
197. See Recent Developments, Reclamation Law in Litigation: Acreage and
Residency Limitations on Private Lands, 21 S.D. L. REV. 695, 730 (1976).
198. 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
The Department of the Interior defines the time of the water-right
sale as the date of approval and the recordation of the water applica-
tion.'9 9 Under this definition, residency is merely a condition prec-
dent to approval of the water application. In the now-vacated Yellen
opinion, Judge Murray rejected the interpretation of the Department
of the Interior and ruled that the residency requirement in section 5
of the 1902 Act was a continuing restriction upon the right to receive
water in perpetuity. 20 0 Judge Murray reasoned that limiting residen-
cy to a threshold requirement would be contrary to the whole tenor
of reclamation law.20 ' Judge Murray believed that threshold residen-
cy would violate anti-speculation policy because investors could es-
tablish residence, buy at low pre-water prices, move away, and later
sell the land at high post-water prices.20 2 However, proper price-
monitoring, not continuing residency, guards against speculation.
20 3
Because Yellen is vacated, residency (if not abolished by the 1926
Act) remains merely a threshold requirement under the Department
of the Interior's interpretation.
The history of the Act of August 9, 1912204 (1912 Act) may indicate
that Congress did not believe residency to be a continuing require-
ment for water rights under the 1902 Act. Section 1 of the 1912 Act
can be interpreted to impose acreage limitations and residency as
threshold requirements only.205 For this reason, Congressman Raker
feared that section 1 would emasculate the 1902 Act.20 6 In response,
Congress passed section 3 of the 1912 Act, which makes the 160-acre
limitation a continuing restriction on water until the landowner
makes the final repayment. 20 7 However, section 3 of the 1912 Act
does not make residency a continuing requirement.2 08 The extension
of the 160-acre limitation without a similar extension of the residen-
cy requirement may imply congressional belief that residency under
the 1902 Act was limited to a threshold requirement,
Does a Residency Requirement Serve any Current Policies?
The outcome of the residency question should turn on the current
validity of the policies residency was designed to effectuate. In 1971,
199. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL RECLAMATION AND RELATED LAWS
ANNOTATED 67 (1972). But see 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 121 (R. Clark ed.
1967).
200. 352 F. Supp. at 1319.
201. Id. at 1306.
202. Id.
203. See text accompanying notes 247-84 infra.
204. 43 U.S.C. §§ 541-546 (1970).
205. 43 U.S.C. § 541 (1970).
206. See 48 CONG. REC. 9083 (1912).
207. 43 U.S.C. § 544 (1970).
208. Id.
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the Yellen court upheld the residency requirement because the "poli-
cy behind reclamation law to aid and encourage owner operated
farms requires enforcement of the residency requirement .... ",01
Although the Ninth Circuit dismissed and vacated Yellen for lack of
standing, other courts may look to policy if confronted with the
residency issue. Also, Congress is examining reclamation policy as it
considers legislation requiring residency.21 °
The first policy, maximization of settlers,211 may no longer be a
valid national policy because the west was settled long ago. 12 The
second policy is the prevention of speculative gain.213 It may be true
that some prospective speculators would not buy if they were re-
quired to reside on or near the land. However, investors may already
live within fifty miles of the property.2 14 Furthermore, even bona fide
resident farmers can realize speculative gains unless speculation is
prevented by another device. This device is control of the sale price.
Speculative gain occurs when land is bought at a pre-water price and
sold at a higher price reflecting the value of a reliable water supply.
Anti-speculation is indeed an important policy. However, specula-
tion is controlled only if the sale price is monitored to exclude value
attributable to federal water.215 Requiring residency adds nothing.
The third reclamation policy is the wide distribution of the federal
subsidy benefits accruing to the owner and to the operator. 216 Lim-
iting the number of acres for which federal project water will be
supplied is the only practical way to further this subsidy policy.217 A
residency requirement will not promote wide distribution of subsidy
benefits because these benefits will accrue to owners and to
operators irrespective of their places of residence.
The policy best served by a residency requirement is the promotion
of the family farm. A recently updated study of two farming
209. 335 F. Supp. at 208.
210. See, e.g., S. 1812, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. REc. S11,294, S1l,300
(daily ed. June 30, 1977).
211. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,045 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.1(a)).
212. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
213. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,045 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.1(d));
see text accompanying notes 67-70 supra & 247-84 infra.
214. 124 CONG. REC. S2533 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978).
215. See text accompanying notes 67-70 supra & 247-84 infra. But cf. 124
CONG. REC. S2532 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (speculation could be controlled by
requiring owner to derive income from the land rather than from renting it out
at fixed fee).
216. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,045 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.1(b)).
See text accompanying notes 71-82 supra.
217. See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
communities in California suggests that small-acreage family farm-
ing creates a better community atmosphere than does large-acreage
corporate or investor farming.218 The small farm community supports
a larger local business district 219 and more than four times the num-
ber of social and civic organizations. 22° There are more schools,
parks, and playgrounds in the small farm community. 221 The small
farm community is relatively self-sufficient, while the large farm
community is more dependent on outside sources of capital.
222
The family-farm policy has often occupied a central place in offi-
cial statements concerning residency. Supporters of the 1902 Act
clearly intended it to promote the family farm.223 The 1910 Bureau
rule that the owner must reside within fifty miles of the subject land
was expressly designed to promote the family farm.224 Family-farm
policy continues to be a major theme in recent debate.225 A recent
attempt to revise reclamation law, the Nelson-Haskell Bill, is entitled
"The Reclamation Lands Family Farm Act of 1977. 1226 If the Nelson-
Haskell Bill becomes law, only individuals meeting certain qualifica-
tions as "family farmers" will be eligible to buy excess land.
227
Despite the evident importance Congress places on family-farm
policy, the congressional vision may be unrealistic. Congress seems to
envision a "mythic family farm" where family ownership, family
operation, and family residence coincide.228 However, marketing,
unionism, 229 and economies of scale have in fact transformed farming
into a modern industry. In the market-oriented family farm, the
place of residence of either the owner or the operator is irrelevant.
230
The Bureau's refusal to enforce a residency requirement 23' may have
reflected a belief that in America it was neither possible nor desir-
able to create a version of Old World peasantry tied to the land.
232
Owner residence on or near the farm is unnecessary if a farm is





223. E.g., 35 CONG. REc. 6758 (1902) (statement of Rep. Martin).
224. Para. 44, Reg. of May 31, 1910, 38 Pub. Lands Dec. 637. See also 42 Fed.
Reg. 43,044, 43,046 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.4(k)).
225. E.g., 1976 Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 145 (statement of John
Krebs).
226. S. 1812, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S11,300 (daily ed. June 30,
1977) (emphasis added).
227. Id.
228. See 35 CONG. REc. 6751-58 (1902); H. HOGAN, supra note 1, at 6.
229. See generally CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-1166.3 (West Supp. 1977).
230. H. HOGAN, supra note 1, at 6.
231. See notes 190-91 and accompanying text supra.
232. H. HOGAN, supra note 1, at 79.
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treated as income-producing property in the American entrepre-
neurial tradition.
233
A 1978 Senate Bill, S.2606,234 would abolish any residency require-
ment. In introducing the Bill, Senator Church indicated that "the law
must be changed to conform with present-day realities. '235 These
realities include non-enforcement of residency and the fact that
many farmers now live well over fifty miles from their farms. 236 The
Church Bill would abolish residency because it no longer effectuates
reclamation policy.
237
However, assuming that Congress continues to pursue the disput-
able family-farm policy, what residency provisions are appropriate?
Residency on the farm itself is unnecessary. Farms can be successful-
ly operated by owners living where they please within commuting
distance. It would be unwise to prevent farmers from living in town
or in another nearby area. The Bureau's 1977 Proposed Rules recog-
nize this fact by allowing residence within a fifty-mile radius of the
farm.2 38 The Nelson-Haskell Bill allows residence "on or near the
land.,
239
In addition, a special residency provision should be created for
retired farmers and for widows wishing to reside outside the fifty-
mile limit. Sale and reinvestment, although not prevented, are not
always practical for an older person.240 The Nelson-Haskell Bill
would provide water to non-excess land owned by a retired farmer
only if he continued to reside on the land.241 A family farmer could
lease the land for two years of any ten-year period, with extentions
for hardship to the owner,242 but an owner would have to live on or
near the land to qualify as a family farmer.243 Thus, it appears that
the Nelson-Haskell Bill makes no provision for the retiree or for the
233. Id.
234. S.2606, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. S2533 (daily ed. Feb. 28,
1978).
235. Id. at S2532.
236. Id.
237. Id. at S2533.
238. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,046 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.4(k)).
239. S. 1812, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S11,300 (daily ed: June 30,
1977).
240. 1976 Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 170-71 (statement of Ralph
Brody).
241. S. 1812, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S11,300, S11,301 (daily ed.
June 30, 1977).
242. Id.
243. Id. at S11,300.
widow wishing to move elsewhere. This problem can be solved by
providing that residence is not a prerequisite to the receipt of project
water for land owned by retired farmers or by widows who evidence
their status as bona fide family farmers by residing on or near their
land for some specified length of time.
244
CURRENT PRoPosALs IN ExcEss-LAND SALE PROCEDURE:
SPECULATION CONTROL AND GOVERNMENTAL FINANCING
The first restriction on the receipt of federal reclamation water is
the acreage limitation. Residency, if required, would place a second
restriction on receipt of water. Non-residents and owners of excess
land are not required by reclamation law to sell their land. The only
direct sanction against ineligible owners is that federal water will
not be supplied for the excess acreage. 245 Nevertheless, few owners
can afford to retain arid or semiarid land without water. Section 46
of the 1926 Act provides that water will be delivered to excess land if
the owner executes a recordable contract to sell the land to an
eligible buyer under terms and conditions satisfactory to the Secre-
tary of the Interior.246 The final section in this Comment examines
two problems occurring in the sale of excess lands: speculation
control and financing.
Speculation Control: Time to Get Tough
Prevention of windfall, speculative gains from dealing in reclama-
tion-project land is a cornerstone reclamation policy.24 Congress
drafted section 12 of the Reclamation Act of August 13, 1914248 to
curb speculation by controlling the sale price of excess land, but
section 12 failed to achieve its purpose because no subsequent sales
were monitored.2 4 9 The 1924 report of the Fact Finders Committee
documented the gross speculation that continued. 256 Congress passed
section 46 of the 1926 Act to end speculative ownership. 251 Section 46
244. Cf. S. 2606, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S2533 (daily ed. Feb. 28,
1978) (residency would be abolished but 10-year proprietorship would be re-
quired).
245. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,047 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.6(a)).
246. 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1970). The Bureau has traditionally placed a 10-year
limit on water delivery to excess land under a recordable contract. Renda,
Owner Eligibility Restrictions-Acreage and Residency, 8 NAT. RESOURCES
LAW. 265, 274 (1975). The 1977 Proposed Rules would allow water delivery under
a recordable contract for only five years. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,046 (1977) (to be
codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.5(a)(2)(i)).
247. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,045 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.1(d)).
See text accompanying notes 67-70 supra.
248. Ch. 247, 38 Stat. 686, 689-90 (1914).
249. 1946 LANDOWNERSHIP SURVEY, supra note 64, at 48.
250. Federal Reclamation by Irrigation, S. Doc. No. 92, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
38-39 (1924).
251. 1946 LANDOWNERSHIP SURVEY, supra note 64, at 29.
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provides for price control in all sales of excess land until one-half of
the construction charges against the excess land are paid.
212
The record of the Bureau in enforcing the resale price controls of
the 1926 Act is poor.2 3 The 1976 GAO Report indicated that the
Bureau's appraisal techniques failed to control speculation in the
Westlands Water District of the Central Valley Project in Califor-
nia.254 The court in National Land for People, Inc. v. Bureau of
Reclamation of the Department of the Interior cited the 1976 GAO
Report with approval, criticized the Bureau's appraisal techniques,
and directed the Bureau to initiate public rule-making proceedings
as to criteria and procedures for approval of excess-land sales.255 In
1977, the Bureau admitted that speculative second sales have not
been monitored.
256
The 1977 Proposed Rules mark a major change in appraisal proce-
dure. The Bureau proposes to control speculation by exercising
continuing supervision over the sale price of land after it is sold into
non-excess status.2 7 A two-tier price approval policy is established.
Former excess land resold within ten years after acquisition must be
sold at a dry-land price. 58 Land that is resold after ten years and
before one-half of the construction charges allocated to irrigation
have been paid is to be sold at a price that does not reflect "unreason-
able profit. '25 9 This provision reverses the current practice of allow-
ing an excess-land purchaser to realize the windfall profits repre-
sented by low-priced federal water in an immediate resale. 260 Thus,
252. 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1970).
253. E.g., Hearings on H.R. 6522 Before the House Comm. on Irrigation and
Reclamation, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1943) (statement of Commissioner Page).
254. 1976 GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 5.
255. 417 F. Supp. 449, 453 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated as moot, No. 76-2027 (D.C.
Cir., Jan. 20, 1978). National Land ForPeople, Inc. was vacated as moot because
in June, 1977, the Secretary placed a moritorium on sales approval of all project
land and had issued the 1977 Proposed Rules. Telephonic interview with
Nicholas Goschy, Attorney, Dept. of the Interior, Washington, D.C. (March 10,
1978). Therefore, the Secretary of the Interior is no longer enjoined from ap-
proving sales of excess lands under prior guidelines such as Basic Solicitor's
Opinions. However, the court lifted the injunction on the condition that the
government not approve any sales in the Westlands until adequate public rule-
making proceedings were completed. Id.
256. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044 (1977).
257. Id.
258. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,048 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.9(b)).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 43,044.
the second-sale protection of the 1926 Act will finally be enforced.
The 1976 GAO Report criticized other appraisal methods permit-
ting speculative gains in the Westlands. The Bureau approved "pack-
age deals" in which the buyer was forced to purchase unwanted
equipment and other chattels. 261 Inadequate techniques for valuing
improvements, irrigation systems, equipment, cars, and machinery in
combined land/chattel sales prevented the Bureau from determining
whether the seller allocated an inaccurately low value to the land in
order to comply with the "pre-project land value" requirement for
Bureau approval. 26 2 The 1977 Proposed Rules solve these speculation
problems by providing that no buyer shall be required to purchase
non-fixture and personal property263 and that non-fixture and per-
sonal property shall be appraised in accordance with the guidelines
in the controlling water-service or repayment contract.2 64 The 1977
Proposed Rules also provide that no post-sale appraisal will be ap-
proved.265 The former practice was to give perfunctory "approval" to
many sales which already had been consummated and recorded,
often without consideration of the pre-project value.
26
One weakness in the appraisal provisions of the 1977 Proposed
Rules is that no attempt is made to specify how pre-project land
value shall be calculated. A key element in speculation control is that
the sale price of excess land shall be "fixed by the Secretary on the
basis of its actual bona fide value at the date of appraisal without
reference to the proposed construction of the irrigation works.
' 267
One thrust of the 1976 GAO Report is that the procedure for calculat-
ing the value of project enhancement is inadequate. 2 8 The 1977
Proposed Rules do not meet this criticism but simply repeat the
statutory requirement that the price must not include enhancement
attributable to the construction of the project.
2 6 9
The Nelson-Haskell Bill specifies a method of calculation. The
"value without project enhancement" is defined as the fair market
value of the land at the initiation of actual construction of the pro-
ject, indexed by the Consumer Price Index for the period between
261. 1976 GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 14.
262. Id., at 6.
263. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,048 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.10(f)),
264. Id. (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.10(g)).
265. Id. (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.12(f)).
266. 1976 GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 7 (117 of the 442 proposed sales in the
Westlands from 1965 to 1975 had been recorded before Bureau approval was
sought).
267. 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1970).
268. 1976 GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 5.
269. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,048 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.10(a)).
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that owner's purchase and sale of the land.2 7 0 The second-sale wind-
fall would be eliminated by the provision that the owner who pur-
chases excess land at a controlled price may not resell the land at a
price greater than his cost, indexed for inflation during the period of
ownership. 27 1 The Nelson-Haskell Bill would lift strict price controls
after ten years, like the 1977 Proposed Rules,272 except that the seller
would be required to have actually farmed the land during the ten-
year period.
273
Two problems remain under any of the current proposals. First,
none of the current proposals provide for reducing the sale price to
exclude value attributable to the increase in ground-water supplies
caused by federal irrigation. Ground water in the Westlands has
increased dramatically since the federal water arrived, thus increas-
ing land values.2 7 4 However, the Bureau's appraisers did not reduce
the approved sale prices to exclude this enhancement .2 7 The 1976
GAO Report recommended that ground-water supply should be con-
sidered in estimating the value of the land without project enhance-
ment.
276
The second problem is that frequent land sales at market value in
some older projects277 have created a situation where present owners
would be unfairly penalized by sales price control. The reason is that
the value of federal water is capitalized into the sale price soon after
the subsidy becomes known because the purchase price reflects the
income that a buyer can expect to derive from the land.278 The
windfall accrues only to the person buying land at low prices before
federal water is available and selling it at high prices afterward.
Once the first windfall is made, the value of the federal subsidy no
270. S. 1812, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S11,300, S11,302 (daily ed.
June 30, 1977).
271. Id.
272. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,044, 43,048 (1977) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. § 426.9(b)).
However, the sale price would continue to be monitored for "unreasonable
profit" under the 1977 Proposed Rules. Id.
273. S. 1812, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S11,300, S11,302 (daily ed.
June 30, 1977).
274. 1976 GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 11.
275. Id.
276. Id., at 14.
277. E.g., a study conducted by Title Insurance and Trust Co. of El Centro,
California revealed that 30% of a randomly selected sample of acres in the
Imperial Valley were sold between 1970 and 1977. See 1978 Palm Springs Hear-
ings, note 16 supra (unpublished statement of Eldon Phillips on file with the San
Diego Law Review). This study implies a 100% turnover every twenty-five years.
278. See Palm Springs Hearings, note 16 supra (unpublished statement of
William W. Wood, Jr. on file with the. San Diego Law Review).
longer can be realized by subsequent sellers.270 Their profit will
merely reflect a general inflation in land prices. Many current Impe-
rial Valley farmers will not realize any windfall because they paid
fair market value prices reflecting project benefits.2 80 Those who sold
to them are beyond the reach of reclamation law because they have
died, retired, or sold out. 281 It is inequitable to penalize a present
owner while the true beneficiary escapes.
The proper solution might be to allow sale at fair market value in
cases where the seller did not own the land when the project benefits
were first capitalized into the land price. Where the land has been in
the seller's family continuously since before the project became
known, the sale should be subject to anti-speculation price controls
because a landowner who bought at pre-project prices presumably
would not capitalize the water value if he sold to a family member.
28 2
In such cases, the present owner could be presumed to have obtained
the land at a pre-water price unless he could prove otherwise.
Government Purchase and Financing
The would-be family farmer will not benefit from reclamation law
designed to help him if he can neither afford the land nor obtain
financing. This problem is greater when improper appraisal tech-
niques fail to reduce the sale price to pre-project levels. Improved
appraisal techniques, promised by the Bureau283 or required by stat-
ute,2 184 could solve part of the price problem. However, the land still
may be unaffordable for two reasons. First, the advent of project
water may be discounted in land values long before federal water
arrives. 215 In this case, the "land price before initiation of the pro-ject" still may be too high for many beginning farmers. Second, it
279. Id.
280. E.g., 1978 Palm Springs Hearings, note 16 supra (unpublished state-
ments of Robert Brown and John Kubler on file with the San Diego Law
Review).
281. Id. (unpublished statement of William W. Wood, Jr. on file with the San
Diego Law Review).
282. But see id. (unpublished statement of Eldon Phillips on file with the San
Diego Law Review) (a recent study by Title Insurance and Trust Co. of El
Centro, California indicated that the sale price of many land transfers within
families in the Imperial Valley is approximately fair market value).
283. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COMMENTS ON THE REPORT OF THE COMP.
GEN. OF THE U.S. TO CONGRESS: "APPRAISAL PROCEDURES AND SOLUTIONS TO
PROBLEMS INVOLVING THE 160 ACRE LIMITATION PROVISION OF RECLAMATION
LAW", reprinted in 1976 Oversight Hearings, supra note 34, at 27.
284. See text accompanying notes 270-73 supra.
285. H. HOGAN, supra note 1, at 289; 1978 Palm Springs Hearings, note 16
supra (unpublished statement of William W. Wood, Jr. on file with the San Diego
Law Review).
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may be unfair to the current owner to appraise his land below cur-
rent market value if the land has changed hands since the initial
capitalization of project benefits. Financing presents an additional
problem to the would-be farmer. Lending institutions may be reluc-
tant to loan money to people without a record of successful
farming.286
The best solution to these price and financing problems is federal
purchase of excess land coupled with federal financing for eligible
buyers. Congress incorporated a governmental purchase and financ-
ing provision in the Columbia Basin Project Act of 1943.287 In 1964,
Secretary of the Interior Udall recommended that Congress establish
a purchase and resale fund that would apply to all the projects.
288 A
broad governmental purchase and resale bill, House Bill 5236,289 was
introduced in 1971 but did not become law. House Bill 5236 would
have prevented private speculative profit by empowering the govern-
ment to buy excess land at pre-project prices.290 However, the Bill
would have allowed the government to sell the land to would-be
farmers at the water-enhanced, current market value. 29' The govern-
ment, not the private seller, would have realized the windfall.292 The
windfall funds were earmarked for public education, for conserva-
tion, and for economic development .29 The justification for this Bill
was that the public investment in reclamation-project construction
should be returned to the public.294 The flaw in House Bill 5236 was
that the price of government land would have been too high for many
would-be farmers to purchase.
The Nelson-Haskell Bill would solve these pricing and financing
problems. Twenty-five million dollars would be appropriated for
1978-1982 for purchase of excess lands by the Secretary of the Interi-
286. San Diego Union, Aug. 28, 1977, § 1, at 10, col. 4 (statement of Bill Gentle,
bank agricultural economist for Security Pacific Bank in Fresno).
287. 16 U.S.C. § 835a(c)(i) (repealed 1962).
288. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., ACREAGE LIMITATION POLI-
CY STUDY PREPARED FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
at ix (Comm. Print 1964).





294. AMERICA'S PUBLIC LANDS 352 (H. Nathan ed. 1972) (statement by Paul
Taylor at the Conference on the Public Land Laws, Dec. 1970).
or.295 The Secretary could lease the government lands to farmers
lacking adequate resources or financing. 29 6 The lease period would be
from two to seven years.297 Leaseholders could buy the land from the
government at the end of the tenancy for the same price the Secretary
paid for the land, indexed for inflation.298 Financing would be ac-
complished by means of federally guaranteed loans made upon cer-
tification of financial inability to buy.
299
SUMMARY
Congress should revise reclamation law in light of modern agricul-
ture.300 Anti-speculation, subsidy, and family-farm policies can be
effectuated by means far less inhibiting to efficient, rewarding farm-
ing than a 160-acre limit. The first step is to increase the basic water
entitlement to a reasonably efficient and adequate level, possibly
1000 acres. Second, a multiplier for family size in the form of family
partnerships, corporations, and trusts should be allowed. Third,
Congress should expressly empower the Secretary of the Interior to
account for variations in growing conditions by setting acreage
equivalencies. The fourth step is to limit leasing. Leasing should be
limited because valuable federal subsidies accrue to operators and to
owners of large acreages even when the Engle formula is adopted. If
the basic entitlement is increased to a reasonably high acreage, the
operator should be restricted to any combination of ownership and
leasing up to the basic entitlement. However, if the basic water
entitlement is not raised, leasing should be allowed to permit effi-
cient and adequate farm sizes.
The courts have failed to resolve the residency issue. Typical
would-be purchasers may not have standing to maintain an action
forcing interpretation of the statutes. Even if standing exists, the
courts could find that reclamation law does not require perpetual
residency. Congress should amend the law to clarify the residency
issue. Residency may no longer further any valid policy. If Congress
expressly reinstates residency, it should define the term liberally in
order to allow farmers great flexibility in their choices of residence.
Residency should not be a continuing prerequisite for project water
for retired farmers and widows.





299. Id. at S1,303.
300. As of the publication date of this Comment, about 35 different bills to
reform reclamation law have been introduced in the 95th Congress. Although
compromise legislation is expected, it is unknown whether any reclamation
legislation will be enacted before the end of the current session. Early reform is
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Once Congress amends the acreage and residency provisions of the
excess-land law, it should provide means to prevent windfall gains in
speculative sales and to enable would-be farmers of modest means to
buy the land. Congress should adopt the appraisal and governmental
loan-guarantee provisions of the Nelson-Haskell Bill.
RANDALL F. KOENIG
PETER R.J. THOMPSON
unlikely in light of the complexity of the problems outlined in this Comment and
the press of other legislative matters. This Comment's treatment of two of these
bills-the Nelson-Haskell Bill and the Church Bill-is intended to illustrate the
nature of current congressional debate.

